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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WOODEY B. SEARLE and VONETTA
SEARLE, RANDY B. SEARLE and
VICKIE SEARLE, RANCE W. SEARLE
and GAIL SEARLE, RHETT A.
SEARLE and TONY SEARLE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 17349

vs.
LONNIE JOHNSON and the
HUMANE SOCIETY OF UTAH,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by the plaintiffs against
Defendants for an alleged financial loss to Plaintiffs'
businesses located in Vernal, Utah caused by Defendants'
actions in protesting the condition of the Uintah CountyVernal City Dog Pound by instituting a campaign allegedly
discouraging tourism in Vernal City and Uintah County.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable David Sam granted Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment and entered a Judgment of no cause of
action in favor of Defendants.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court

decisi~.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A review of the record filed before this Court and the
"Statement of Facts" submitted by Appellants in their brief
shows that such "Statement" contains distortions of the

tr~

facts, innuendos which are not justified, and further omits
much of the evidence which was before the lower court at
the time the Sununary Judgment was granted.

While it is true

that this Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the appellants for purposes of reviewing a
Sununary Judgment, it is also true that the entire record
must be examined including evidence submitted by both
sides of the controversy.
(Utah 1976).

Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d 246

For this reason, Respondents shall restate

the facts in their entirety with the purpose of presenting
a complete and objective recitation of the lower court
record.
The Humane Society of Utah, contrary to Appellants'
assertion, is not affiliated in any way with any other
national organization.

It has been formed for the purpose

of protecting animals and preventing cruelty to them in
accordance with various state and local laws.

As early as

-2-
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1971 the Humane Society requested the Uintah County
Commission and Vernal City Council to improve the jointly
owned facility located near Vernal, Utah which was used
for the impoundment and destruction of dogs.

(R. 151).

From 1971 through 1975 it is uncontradicted that various
contacts were made between the Humane Society and government
officials of both Uintah County and Vernal City.

(R. 151-152).

On February 22, 1974 a letter was written to Uintah
High School by an agent of the Humane Society of Utah
describing the conditions of the pound which was maintained
by the city and county.

The letter stated that animals

were being executed by a sheriff who would sit on the
tailgate of an automobile and shoot at the animals located
in the wire enclosures until each was hit.

(R. 148-150).

On August 5, 1975, Thomas Little, the executive director
of the Humane Society, sent a letter to Jack Allred, a
city councilman of Vernal City, and stated the following:
Pursuant to our phone conversation the other
day, please find enclosed two copies of a letter
that was mailed to every resident of Cedar City
plus all media.
In the case of Vernal and Uintah
Counties, we would place emphasis on tourists not
missing the freezing, filthy little sheds in
Dinosaur Land's sewer plant, etc., etc. Please
advise of the city and county's attitude.
I leave
October 1st, and will require two weeks to prepare
and submit news releases, mailing, etc.
(R. 154).
No action was taken by the Humane Society at that time in
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spite of the fact that 47 animals had to be euthanized
due to distemper contacted at the pound.

(R. 152).

On February 11, 1976 the Humane Society's chief investigator visited the pound and found eleven animals had
died as a result of insufficient shelter and that several
animals were in need of care due to the surrounding
environment.

He concluded that the animals were being

confined in a cruel and illegal manner (R. 143-144, 146,
152).

The Humane Society contacted the Uintah County

Attorney who declined to prosecute the Uintah County
Commission or the Vernal City Council for the maintenance
of the pound on the basis that the members were "immune"
from any action.
Shortly after the discovery of these dead aminals,
a campaign was instituted by the Humane Society to attempt
to eliminate the conditions existing at the pound.

On

February 14 through 18, 1976 commercial air time was
purchased on the local radio station in Vernal and each
commercial was aired six times a day.

This commercial

stated the following:
Eleven animals experienced barbaric deaths
in one twenty-four hour period at the Vernal-Uintah
County Pound.
The death of these animals can be
attributed to the unconscious, brutal attitude of
your local officials. This responsibility must be

-4-
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shared by the residents of the Uintah Basin.
Refusal to accept assistance and cooperation
from the Humane Society over the past six
years has an effect on all life including
yours.
The Humane Society of Utah will take
every action available to rectify the disgrace
of the bullet-riddled tin shacks used as a
pound in Vernal.
We ask your help in supporting
us.
Contact your officials today.
(R. 133).
A newspaper ad was placed in the Vernal Express on
February 19, 1976.

This ad stated the following:

WANTED, an answer from your council and
commission.
Your commissioners and councilmen
were responsible for the deaths of eleven animals
in one night.
There is little question they are
in violation of Utah criminal statutes. The Humane
Society of Utah has been trying for five years to
get the people of Vernal to build a decent, humane
animal pound to replace the disgraceful tin shacks
you see here.
The responsibility for the welfare
of all your animals must be shared by every resident
of Uintah County.
What is your answer? The Humane
Society of Utah, 4613 South 4000 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84020, 298-3548.
(R. 145).
On February 20, 1976 a meeting was held between the
Humane Society and Utah Attorney General Vernon Romney.
It was the Humane Society's position that the Uintah County
Attorney had wrongfully refused to prosecute the government
officials for maintenance of the pound.

The Attorney General

concluded, however, that such a decision was discretionary
with the County Attorney and was not within the power of
the Attorney General's office.

(R. 134, 145).

In March of 1976 a single billboard was erected at
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33rd South and 600 West in Salt Lake City which stated
the following:
Dinosaur Land--Don't miss the bullet-riddled
shacks--See pets swelter in the heat and freeze
in the cold--Visit city-county pound--Vernal-Paid for by the Humane Society of Utah.
(R. 134).
In conjunction with this billboard several interviews
were conducted by news media with agents of the Humane
Society.

Copies of some of these news reports are con-

tained in the record.

(R. 139-141) .

During several inter-

views defendant Johnson was asked whether he felt the
erection of the billboard by the Humane Society would have an
adverse effect on tourism in Uintah County.

Johnson stated

that he hoped so in order that there would be pressure put
on local officials to make the needed and necessary pound
improvements.
On March 17, 1976 plaintiff filed this action in the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Uintah County alleging
that he had been injured by the conduct of defendant Lonnie
Johnson in discouraging tourists from entering Vernal City
and asking for damages of $250,000 caused from such loss.
It should be noted that this suit was commenced in less
than thirty days from the time the first campaign was
begun within Vernal City itself.
In a subsequent interview on the date the lawsuit was
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filed, Mr. Johnson stated, "If Mr. Searle is really
interested in enticing tourism in the Uintah Basin, my
suggestion would be to clean up the pound.
malicious about our advertising.

There is nothing

It just states the facts

and I am willing to back that up in court."

(R. 133).

Since the appellants have attempted to completely
distort the attempted removal of this case to Federal Court,
it is necessary to briefly address this procedure.
(Appellants' Brief pp. 5-6).

On April 7, 1976 Lonnie

Johnson filed an action in the U.S. District Court to remove
the case from the state court on the assumption that this
Court's decision in State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936

(Utah

1975) expressly held that the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution did not apply to the states through the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore Defendants'
claim of First Amendment privilege would not be recognized
in the state court.

(R.

23-25).

Judge Willis Ritter granted Searle's Motion to Remand
back to the state court on the basis that the state "Complaint"
did not present a claim or right arising under the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States.

(R. 63).

The lower

Federal District Court held that the First Amendment defense
asserted by defendant Lonnie Johnson did not permit removal
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to the Federal District Court since the Searles' Complaint
was not based upon federal constitutional or federal law.
A second action was filed in the Federal District
Court for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Federal
Civil Rights Act.

It was again claimed that the decision

of this Court in the Phillips case precluded the assertion
of the First Amendment right as a defense in the state
action.

Appellant Searle opposed this action also and

specifically stated that Respondents' First Amendment
rights would be adequately protected in the state court
proceeding and that the Phillips case has not been followed
by this Court as evidenced by subsequent decisions.
208).

(R. 206-

The lower Federal District Court dismissed the

declaratory judgment action without comment.

(R. 205).

It should be noted that the lower Federal District
Court made no ruling whatsoever as to the merits of the
case or as to the defenses of constitutional privilege
raised by respondent Johnson.

The rulings were simply

that the defenses asserted by Respondents could not be used
as a means of gaining entry into the Federal Court system
when the plaintiffs' Complaint itself did not contain
federal or constitutional affirmative issues.
Respondent Lonnie Johnson asserted numerous defenses

-8-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the state court action against Plaintiffs' Complaint including
improper venue, truth of the matter asserted, privileged
communication, First and Fourteenth Amendment privilege, Utah
State Constitution privilege, and failure to specify special
damages.

(R.

13-17).

Respondent Lonnie Johnson sought a Motion for Change
of Venue on the theory that an impartial trial could not
be held in Uintah County since a claim was made that the
entire economy of the county had been injured by the
publicity generated by Respondent.

(R. 19-20).

The Motion

for Change of Venue was denied by the lower court on July
15, 1976.

(R.

121).

In November of 1977 defendant Lonnie Johnson moved
for Summary Judgment on the basis that the actions complained
against by Plaintiffs were privileged under the First Amendment right of freedom of speech and that Plaintiff belonged
to too large a class to maintain a suit.

(R. 176).

At that

time an affidavit was filed by Lonnie Johnson which stated
the following:
(1)
That Lonnie Johnson was the executive
director of the Humane Society of Utah which was
a non-profit organization created for the prevention
of cruelty to animals;
(2)
That at all times Johnson was acting in
the public interest and in furtherance of the
stated purpose of the Humane Society;
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....

(3)
Any action on the part of Johnson concerning the pound or tourist trade was motivated
by a desire to influence the elected officials
of Vernal City and Uintah County to make needed
changes in the dog pound;
(4)
Any statements made concerning the
condition of the dog pound was based upon Johnson's
personal observation or upon reports by agents of
the Humane Society;
(5)
At no time was Johnson acquainted with the
plaintiff or any of his businesses and at no time
did Johnson hold any ill will to plaintiff or
intentionally seek to damage him.
(R. 191-192) .
A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of Plaintiff
by Demar Dudley who stated that he had heard Lonnie Johnson
on a Salt Lake radio station in which Johnson urged the
radio audience to boycott Vernal and not to vacation or
use the tourist facilities.

The affidavit further stated

that Johnson expressed his intention to damage financially
and economically the residents of Vernal, Utah engaged in
the tourist business.

(Tr. 228).

In addition to these

affidavits, both parties had submitted Answers to Interrogatories prior to Defendants' Motion which contained their
various theories
156-165) .

of action and defense.

(R.

132-155;

The Motion of Defendant for Summary Judgment

was denied by the Honorable Allan B. Sorensen on December
21, 1977.

(R.

245).

Throughout the proceedings Plaintiffs filed three

-10-
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Amended Complaints ultimately adding some eight more
plaintiffs and the Humane Society of Utah as a defendant
in addition to modifying the claims and damages being sought.
(R.

6, 160, 388, 465).
In August of 1979 this matter was set for trial before

the Honorable David Sam.

After two days of attempting to

empanel an impartial jury the lower court granted Defendants'
Motion for Change of Venue and ordered the matter be transferred to Utah County.

(R. 414).

On July 7, 1980 Defendants moved for Summary Judgment
once again based upon recent federal court decisions
involving similar cases.

The positions of both parties were

extensively briefed and on July 29, 1980 the lower court
issued its ruling.

The court stated in its minute entry:

The Court has examined the pleadings on file
herein and the recent ruling of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Missouri
v. NOW, Docket No. 79-1379 and finds under the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint and the law applicable
to those allegations that there is a First Amendment
defense which bars Plaintiff's claim since Defendant's
actions were politically motivated and not initiated
for any anti-competitive, commercial or economic purpose.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant's activities
are privileged on the basis of the First Amendment
right to petition and in recognition of that important
right even though it conflicts with commercial efforts.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted,
no cause of action.
(R. 471).
An

order reflecting this ruling was signed by the

-11-
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lower court on August 12, 1980.

(R. 1-2).

this order that the present appeal is taken.

It is from
(R.

4 72).

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.
The Action of Defendants to Petition a Government
for Political Change is an Absolute Right Under the United
States Constitution and Utah Constitution in the Absence
of a Showing That Such Action is a "Sham".
The lower court in its ruling stated the following:
[U]nder the allegations of Plaintiff's
Complaint and the law applicable to those
allegations • • . there is a First Amendment
defense which bars Plaintiff's claim since
Defendant's actions were politically motivated
and not initiated for any anti-competitive,
commercial or economic purpose. Accordingly,
the Court finds that Defendant's activities are
privileged on the basis of the First Amendment
right to petition and in recognition of that
important right even though it conflicts with
commercial efforts.
(R. 471).
Appellants maintain that the lower court erred in this
ruling and that the right to petition for political change doe
not confer an absolute First Amendment right on the petitioner
but only confers a conditional right which must be proven unde
the circumstances of each case.

(Appellants' Brief pp. 16-18)

Thus, under Appellants' reasoning the common law tort of
interference with contract comprises the substantive law
and the First Amendment privilege of petitioning constitutes
only a defense to the violation of this law.
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The position taken by Appellants it totally without
merit.

As will be examined, the United States Supreme

Court and numerous other federal courts have held that the
First Amendment right to petition for a political change is
paramount and superior to all federal and state statutory
and common law.

Only in rare instances in cases involving

a "sham" can this right be defeated by application of state
and federal law.

For this reason, the ruling of the lower

court was correct in finding an absolute right existed in
the instant case.
1.

The "Noerr Doctrine" and Subsequent Cases.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
states the following:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.
Likewise, Section 1 of Article I of the Utah Constitution
states a similar principle:
All men have the inherent and unalienable
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberty;
to acquire, possess, and protect property, to
worship according to the dictates of their
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest
against wrongs, and petition for redress of
grievances; to communicate ~reely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse
of that right.
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Thus, both the United States and Utah Constitutions
clearly give citizens the right to petition their government
for grievances and to corrununicate freely their thoughts.

rt

is fundamental that these rights should not be restricted
except in instances where a clear abuse of these rights
has occurred.
The landmark case decided by the United States Supreme
Court concerning the right to petition governments for
change is Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).

In Noerr a lower federai

district court found liability pursuant to the antitrust
laws against the defendant railroad which had conducted an
extensive campaign to bring about legislation directed
against the railroad's chief competitors, the long-haul
truckers.

There was evidence that the campaign was aimed

at destroying the truckers as competitors and that the railroads had employed a widespread publicity and lobbying
effort which was found to be highly deceptive.

The federal

appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding.

The

United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment right
to petition the government for the redress of grievances
barred any interpretation of the Sherman Act to impose
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liabilities for the railroad's activities.

Specifically,

it held that the Act could not be applied to such activities
"Insofar as [the activities] comprised mere solicitation of
governmental actions with respect to the passage and
enforcement of laws."

365 U.S. at 138.

This principle

was irrespective of the railroad's motives or unethical
methods in exercising the constitutional right.
Although the truckers did not base their complaint
on the conunon law tort of interference with contractual
or business relations, the truckers argued that the railroad's

campaign was intended to and did injure the truckers

with their customers and other public relations.

The Court

held that such injury was incidental to the railroad's attempt
to influence governmental action and therefore no liability
could attach.

The Court stated the following:

[To hold for the truckers] would substantially
impair the power of government to take actions
through its legislature and executive and operate
to restrain trade.
In a representative democracy
such as this, these branches of government act on
behalf of the people and to a very large extent,
the whole concept of representation depends upon
the ability of the people to make their wishes
know to their representatives.
Id. at 137.
The Court then noted that the Sherman Act was subordinate
to the First Amendment right of petition:
To hold that the government retains the
power to act in representative capacity and yet
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hold, at the same time, that the people cannot
freely inform the government of their wishes
would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to
regulate, not business activity, but political
activity, a purpose which has no basis whatever
in the legislative history of that Act.
Secondly,
and of at least equal significance, such a
construction of the Sherman Act would raise
important constitutional questions.
The right
of petition is one of the freedoms protected
by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course,
lightly impute to Congress an attempt to invade
these freedoms.
Id. at 138.
(Emphasis added).
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized, however, that if a
campaign is designed not to change government policy but
solely to eliminiate competition then such activity is not
constitutionally protected.

The Court stated:

There may be situations in which a publicity
campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing
government action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a
competitor and the Sherman Act would be justified.
But this certainly is not the case here. No one
denies that the railroads were making a genuine
effort to influence legislation and law enforcement
practices.
Id. at 143, 144.
The Noerr doctrine was later re-asserted in the subsequent case of United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965).

The court there stated:

Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted
public officials regardless of
intent or purpose. The Court of Appeals, however,
would hold the conduct illegal depending upon proof
of an illegal purpose . . . [This holding is not]
permitted by Noerr for the reasons stated in that
case. Joint efforts to influence public officials
effor~influence
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do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition.
Such conduct
is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of
a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman
Act. Id. at 670.
In 1972 the court recognized the "sham" exception in
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508

(1972) and found that the activities of the

defendant in alleged government petition was merely an effort
to eliminate a competitor with no real purpose in changing
existing legislation.
Appellants attempt in their brief to assert that the
Noerr doctrine and subsequent case law concerns only an
exception to the antitrust law and that somehow a corrunon
law tort of interference with contractual relations is not
(Appellants' Brief pp. 19-23).

affected by this doctrine.

This argument is completely without merit as is evidenced
by several court decisions in which it is clear that First
Amendment rights transcend both federal antitrust laws
and state corrunon law.
One of the best examples of application of this
principle is found in Sierra Club v. Humboldt Fur, Inc.,
349 F. Supp. 934

(D. Cal. 1972).

In that case the Sierra

Club had petitioned the United States government to declare
certain areas as wilderness.

A company which had entered
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into a contract with the U.S. Forest Service for logging
in that area filed a complaint against the Sierra Club
alleging state law liability for interference with an
advantageous contractual relationship.

The complaint

alleged that the Sierra Club had intentionally, willfully,
and wrongfully induced the United States to breach the
contract with the company by asserting administrative appeals
and that such actions resulted in the loss of the contract.
On a motion to dismiss filed by the Sierra Club based
upon First Amendment right of petitioning the government
for redress, the court granted the motion on the basis that
the company failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.
The court in granting the motion made the following
observation:
The Supreme Court has never had occasion to
decide what effect the right to petition the
government has upon corrunon law tort actions that
might be brought against those who damage the
interest of others in the exercise of this right
(the right to petition the government for a redress
of grievances).
This Court believes, however,
that the Supreme Court has outlined the applicable
principles of law in its cases dealing with the
relationship between the First Amendment and def amation and in cases interpreting the Sherman Act
as inapplicable to those who conspire to bring
about government action.
Id. at 936.
The court noted first that the New York Times v. Sullivan
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case, 370 U.S. 254, extended the First Amendment guarantee
of free speech to the common law tort of defamation.

The

court stated that liability under common law defamation can
only be imposed:
[W]hen what appears to be an attempt to
discuss matters of public interest is a "sham"
in that the speaker knows his statements are
false or speaks with reckless disregard of
whether they are true or false.
Importantly,
the Court recently made it absolutely clear
that absent this "sham" use common law "malice"
is irrelevant to a person's right to speak freely
without fear of liability. Rosenbloom v. Metro
Media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, n. 52 (1971).
Id. at 937.
The Sierra court then examined comr.ion law torts in
relation to the Noerr doctrine formulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court.

The court stated the following:

This Court agrees that when a suit based on
interference with advantageous relations is
brought against a party whose "interference"
consisted of petitioning a government body to
alter its previous policy, a privilege is created
by the guarantee of the First Amendment. This
Court, however, does not believe that privilege
should depend upon malice. For the reasons given
by the Supreme Court in Eastern Railroad President's
Conference, supra, this court is persuaded that
all persons, regardless of motive, are guaranteed
by the First Amendment the right to speak to
influence the government or its officials to adopt
new policy .
Id. at 938.
(Emphasis added).
The court rejected a "malice" standard and instead stated
that "liability can be imposed for activities ostensibly
consisting of petitioning the government for redress of
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grievances only if the petitioning is a 'sham' and the
real purpose is not to obtain governmental action but to
otherwise injure the plaintiff."

Id. at 939.

Several other cases have recently supported these
principles that an activity to influence government policy
is absolutely protected in the absence of showing that
such activity was for the sole purpose of injuring or
destroying a third party and was therefore a "sham"
attempt to petition the government.
The case closest factually to the instant case is
State of Missouri v. National Organization for Women, 467

F. Supp.289 (D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.
1980).
Inc.,

In that case the National Organization for Women,
(NOW) organized a convention boycott against all

states that had not ratified the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment.

One of the states toward which the boycott

was directed was Missouri.

The state consequently brought

an action in parens patriae for all of its citizens and
businesses injured because of the actions of NOW.

The

state sued under the federal antitrust laws, state antitrust laws, and state common law tort theories including
interference with contractual relations.
The lower court found that the motivation of NOW in
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organizing the boycott was to make a symbolic gesture and
to attract attention of the public to the issue of ratif ication.

The court further found that NOW intended that the

adverse economic impact of the boycott on those who would
otherwise profit from conventions in Missouri would cause
those persons to influence their legislators to support
ERA ratification.

The court found that the boycott was not

intended as a punitive measure against Missouri for its past
failure to ratify and that it was not motivated in any way
by anti-competitive purposes since NOW was in no way competing
with Missouri or its citizens.

Finally, the lower court

found that the boycott was non-commercial in that its participants were not business interests and its purpose was
not increased profits and furthermore that the boycott was
"non-economic, as it was not undertaken to advance the
economic self-interest of the participants."

467 F. Supp

at 293-296.
The conduct complained of by Missouri was NOW's activity
in organizing a concerted effort to encourage businesses
and groups not to utilize the facilties of the state of
Missouri for the holding of various types of commercial
and non-commercial conventions. NOW contacted numerous
organizations, conducted a wide-spread publicity campaign,
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and did everything possible to influence groups from
entering those states which had not ratified the ERA.
The lower court found the efforts of NOW were effective
in that approximately $9,000,000 of convention revenue
was lost to the state of Missouri because of the economic
boycott.
The lower district court found in favor of NOW both
as to the antitrust claims and as to the state tort claims.
The lower court found the Noerr doctrine precluded federal
and state antitrust liability since the campaign of NOW
was politically motivated and was not a mere sham to cover
up an attempt to interfere with the business relationship
of a competitor.

In fact, the court noted that none of

the parties could be considered competitors.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the antitrust aspect of the case by stating the following:
NOW appears to have utilized its political
power to bring about the ratification of the ERA
by the state of Missouri. The tool it chose was
a boycott, a device economic by nature.
However,
using a boycott in a non-competitive political
arena for the purpose of influencing legislation
is not proscribed by the Sherman Act.
620 F.2d
at 1315.
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the state anti trust claim on the same overriding
principle. Id. at 1316.
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The state tort claims for interference with contract,
the same claim now asserted by Appellants in the instant
case, were also considered by the lower federal district
court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The lower

district court stated the following with reference to the
economic tort claim:
In this case economic pressure is being
utilized in a good faith effort to influence the
ratification of an amendment to the Constitution.
In these circumstances, the interest sought to
be advanced by NOW and especially the constitutional
interest involved in protecting NOW's ability to
exercise its right to petition and right to
political association outweigh the interest in
protecting the business expectancy involved.
If
NOW's actions were not a legitimate effort to
influence the legislature, this Court would be
presented with a different case. Under the
particular facts of this case, the Court finds
that NOW's convention boycott activities are
privileged and therefore not actionable in court
under Missouri law.
467 F. Supp.at 305-306.
(Emphasis added) .
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the state
tort claim dismissal and specifically found that only in
those instances where a "sham" petitioning effort was being
made to eliminate a competitor could liability be imposed.
The court reviewed the Noerr doctrine, subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, and the Sierra Club decision, supra, and
stated the following:
We agree with the Sierra Club court and
find sufficient support in Noerr anJ the subsequent cases of the Supreme Court which refer to
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Noerr to support the conclusion that the right
to petition is of such importance that it is not
an improper interference even when exercised by
way of a boycott.
602 F.2d at 1317.
Thus, the courts in the NOW case concluded that the
Noerr doctrine was not limited solely to controversies
involving the antitrust laws but was much broader by prohibiting any interference with the right to petition and
seek change of government under any state or federal
theory in the absence of showing that such effort was not
legitimate and was in fact a "sham".
Other federal cases support the absolute right
granted for seeking political change.

In First National

Bank of Omaha v. Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis,
482 F. Supp. 514

(D. Minn. 1979), aff 'd, No. 80-1043 (8th

Cir., Sept. 9, 1980) a suit was brought by one bank seeking
to restrain an out-of-state bank from engaging in a bank
credit card program.

The lower court granted defendant's

motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint both as to federal
banking laws, antitrust laws, and state tort law.

The

Federal District Court of Minnesota in dismissing the state
claim of interference with business relationships again
cited the Sierra Club decision and held as a matter of law
that the activities of the defendants were protected by
the Noerr doctrine.

The court then stated:
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Several recent cases have stated that while
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved from antitrust claims, the First Amendment rights that it
protects apply equally to other claims including a
claim for tortious interference with business relationships . . . . The court agrees with this analysis
since to hold otherwise would effectively kill the
defendants' First Amendment rights.
Id. at 524-525.
(Emphasis added) .
In Pennwalt Corp. v. Zenith Laboratories, 427 F. Supp.
413 (D. Mich. 1979) an action was brought under the federal
antitrust laws and numerous other state and federal laws
for unfair competition and trademark infringements.

The

court dismissed those claims involving the efforts of one
of the manufacturing drug companies to sue or to threaten
suit against various customers of a competing drug company.
In dismissing the claims the court stated:
While the Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved
from antitrust claims, the First Amendment rights
that it protects are equally applicable to each of
the other claims made by Zenith. As in antitrust
cases, these are not absolute rights, but as discussed, nothing in the allegations made by Zenith
would bring any of these claims within the "sham"
exception to these First Amendment rights. For
this reason, all of the remaining counterclaims
are dismissed.
Id. at 242.
In the recent case of Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v.
Waldman, 1980-2 Trade Cas. •63,627 (D. Pa. March 21, 1980)
the Federal District Court of Pennsylvania held that where
service station attendants had shut down their service
stations for a three-day period to protest the Department
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of Energy's policy in profit margin there was no violation
of federal or state anti-competitive laws.

The court held

that a boycott was a form of political expression and
therefore protected by the First Amendment.

In so holding,

the court observed:
The dealers could obviously ban together and
present a written or oral demand .
. to enforce
existing regulations and laws .
But the
dealers had been doing that with little or no
apparent success.
It might reasonably be that
the only means of effective expression was the
boycott.
For us to hold that they must have
continued to rely upon strictly written and oral
conununication would be to deny them what may have
been their only effective means of conununication
arousing public sentiment. This we will not do.
Finally, the case of Henry v. First National Bank of
Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979) is also relevant
in determining whether liability can attach for a political
boycott effort.

This case began in the 1960's when a group

of blacks organized boycotts against white merchants.
Actions were brought under state statutes and state common
law which prohibited secondary boycotts, restraints of trade,
unlawful conspiracies, and tortious interference with
contracts.
Damages in excess of $3,000,000 were sought for the
economic harm done to the merchants during the boycott.
The state trial court found in favor of the state and the
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merchants and the decision was affirmed by the Mississippi
Supreme Court.
An action was later brought in the federal district
court to enjoin enforcement of the state court's judgment.
The lower federal district court ordered an injunction be
entered.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the

propriety of the lower court's injunction.

The black organi-

zation claimed that the damage award was unconstitutional
since it prohibited and penalized activity protected by
the First Amendment.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in

dealing with the likelihood of success on the merits in
the issuance

of the injunction stated the following:

Consistent with the views underlying its
injunction, the state court assessed the state
defendants for all damages suffered by the state
plaintiffs during the period of the boycott which
the court found attributable to the failure or
refusal of black citizens to trade with the white
businesses in anticipated numbers.
At the heart of the chancery court's
opinion lies the belief that the mere organization of the boycott and every activity undertaken in support thereof could be subject to
judicial prohibition under state law.
This
view accords insufficient weight to the First
Amendment protection of political speech and
association.
There is no suggestion that the N.A.A.C.P.,
M.A.T. or the individual defendants were in
competition with the white businesses or that
the boycott arose from economic interest. On
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the contrary, the boycott grew out of a racial
dispute with the white merchants and city
government of Port Gibson and all of the
picketing, speeches, and other communications
associated with the boycott were directed to
the elimination of racial discrimination in the
town.
This differentiates this case from a boycott
organized for economic ends, for a speech to
protest racial discrimination is essential political
speech lying at the core of the First Amendment.
Id. at 303.
The principles outlined in the preceding cases clearly
establish that the lower court was correct in its conclusion
that the activities of defendants in the instant case were
protected and were not subject to liability.
2. Legal Standards Applied to Facts of the
Instant Case.
The Noerr doctrine and the subsequent cases decided
under this doctrine clearly hold that unless it can be
established that an activity for governmental change is
actually a "sham", such activity is constitutionally
superior to federal and state statutory law as well as
state conunon law.

In the instant case, there can be no

doubt from an examination of the pleadings in this case and
the evidence submitted by the parties that no such "sham"
exists and that the efforts of defendants were a legitimate
effort to change the attitude and policy of the Vernal City
and Uintah County governments.
The plaintiffs themselves throughout the four Amended
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Complaints consistently stated that the purpose of
Defendants' campaign was to cause political change.
Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint
states the following:
Defendants' campaign to interfere with and
destroy the tourist business in Dinosaur Land,
Utah, is motivated by their personal, political
and other beliefs relating to city and county
government in Vernal City and Uintah County and
are not related to Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs'
businesses.
Defendants, nevertheless, have
attempted to interfere with and destroy the
tourist business in Dinosaur Land in which
business Plaintiffs are engaged and by which
they make their living.
Defendants' motives
were to destroy or interfere with the tourist
business as a means of imposing their views of
government on Vernal City and Uintah County officials.
(R. 467).
(Emphasis added).
Thus, the plaintiffs themselves admit that the campaign
instituted by Defendants was a legitimate effort to protest
the conditions at the pound and to influence the governmental
officials in instituting change.

The facts previously stated

support this conclusion unequivocably.
Since 1971 the Humane Society attempted to bring about
a change in the deplorable conditions existing at the Vernal
City-Uintah County dog pound.
meetings

Numerous letters were written,

were held, and even a warning of an adverse

publicity campaign was given

to the Vernal City Council

some two years before the campaign was instigated.
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When the dead animals were discovered in February
of 1976 an all-out campaign was begun by the Humane Society.
This campaign, however, did not merely consist of encouraging
a boycott of tourist businesses but initially consisted of
an effort to inform the citizens of Vernal and Uintah County
of the conditions which existed at the pound.

Numerous

radio ads were broadcast in Vernal City and a full-page ad
was run in the Vernal City and Uintah County newspapers.
These corrunercials and ads were directed solely at the
citizens of Vernal and Uintah County who were asked to
contact their respective government officials to protest
the conditions existing.
The billboard which was placed in Salt Lake City did
not discourage tourists but instead asked them to "Visit
the City-County Pound in Vernal" and to see the "bulletriddled shacks".
The corrunents made by defendant Lonnie Johnson as to a
tourist boycott were only an incidental part of the overall
campaign.

Johnson stated that he hoped that people would

protest to the governments of Vernal and Uintah County
including a boycott of those entities until such time as
the conditions had been corrected.

Thus, any effort by

Defendants to discourage tourists to the Uintah County
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Basin was only a portion of the overall campaign which
had been launched to effectuate change in the city and
county governments.
There has never been any contention by the plaintiffs
that the effort of the Humane Society was not in fact to
modify the conditions at the pound.

It has never been

contended by Plaintiffs that Defendants sought to eliminate
the Vernal businesses for some competitive gain or advantage.

It has never been claimed that Defendants competed in

any way with the businesses of Plaintiffs or other
businesses in Uintah County.
Thus, under the Noerr doctrine, in the absence of a
showing that the purpose of the "boycott" was a sham, the
conduct of Defendants is absolutely protected.

The Sierra

Club case graphically pointed out that when an organization
is seeking government change through legitimate political
activity the fact that other parties are economically harmed
does not give rise to either statutory or common law
liability.
The NOW case involves almost identical motives and
factual situations.

In NOW the purpose of the activity

was to promote the ratification of the ERA amendment.

In

the instant case, the purpose of the activity was to upgrade
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Appellants contend that the actions of Defendants
seeking a change in the dog pound is not entitled tc
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...... c-

same type of protection of a group seeking a co:-isti tut1:::=.~
amendment.

(Appellants' Brief p. 23) .
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doubts" as to whether the activities engaged in

b~·

Cefe:'.C.=.::.:;

constitutes an exercise of First Amendment right, a:ld

"·~·:-.e::-.=.:

the actions sought to be extracted by Defendants were eve::
political in nature".

(Appellants' Brief p. 24).

statement is nonsensical.

Sud·_ a

It is not a function of courts

to determine the relative merits of the cause of an orga:'.:z=.tion or to decide whether one cause is worthy of protecti.::;::
while another one is not.

It is clear that in both the

NOW case and the instant case a change was being sought
the legislative bodies of both entities.
In both cases economic boycott was urged to protest
the conditions existing in the communities in which cha:-i::;e
was being sought.

NOW encouraged outside orga:lizations :'.::

to book conventions in Missouri.

Defendants encouraged

tourists not to visit Uintah County.

In both cases eccn::i:-::
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mental officials in making the requested changes.
Appellants contend that the XOK case is i:-iappropri.a:e
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convention business from the Holiday-Johnson Motel
(HJM) until HJM goes to its legislator and convinces
its legislator to vote for the ratification of the
proposed ERA. This characterization of the facts
protrays HJM as the target of NOW's boycott.
The
target of the boycott was not HJM; it was the state
of Missouri.
We find Missouri's focus on the facts of this
case, and not the district courts--misleading.
The
district court's view is more appropriate for the
issues at hand.
NOW's boycott was directed against
states that had yet to ratify the proposed ERA.
NOW was aware that such a boycott would work against
the public's economic interest; NOW was hopeful
that the public's interest would suffer to the
extent that the public would be persuaded that
ratification of the ERA was "desirable;" NOW wanted
the public to influence the legislature to ratify
the ERA; NOW operated on the presumption that
legislators act with regard to the public interest.
620 F.2d at 1312-1313, n. 12.
Similarly, the record shows without question that it
was the intent of the defendants to put pressure on the
public in Uintah County for them to in turn pressure the
various county and city governments to effectuate change.
At no time were the businesses of Plaintiffs or any other
businesses the "target" of Defendants' efforts.

Rather,

all efforts were directed towards the political entities
which could change the conditions at the dog pound and
internal and external pressures which could be applied to
such entities were utilized as tools for the change.
Therefore, a close analysis of the instant case as
compared with the NOW decision in the lower court and the
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Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals shows a remarkable similarity
and shows that the same claim now being made by the
plaintiffs, i.e., an interference with contractual relations,
was soundly rejected on the basis of the Noerr doctrine.
The decision in the recent Crown Central Petrolum
case is equally applicable.

The appellants in the instant

case have claimed that Defendants had "many lawful avenues
open to them by which they could petition the local government entities to seek desired changes in the dog pound."
(Appellants' Brief pp. 22-23).

This statement both ignores

the previous five-year effort to effectuate such change
and also ignores the right of Defendants to choose whatever
means they believe is most effective to accomplish their
goal.

As the court in the Crown Central Petroleum case

noted the Noerr doctrine allows a group to arouse public
sentiment in any reasonable manner and a court cannot say
that one means of communication is preferable to another.
Finally, the Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale
case is also applicable to the instant situation.

In that

case black organizations instituted boycotts against merchants
to eliminate racial discrimination in a southern town.

Even

though merchants guilty of discrimination and innocent of
discrimination were both equally harmed, the court held that
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thev could not recover for the economic loss sustained
as a result of an effort to politically change the
environment existing in the community.

Likewise, the

fact that townspeople, merchants, or taxpayers were
indirectly harmed by any supposed boycott by tourists of
the Uintah County area is not actionable when such efforts
were purely political in nature and were not directed to
causing economic harm to eliminate competition.
Appellants' suggestion that the actions of Defendants
can be likened to the illegal holding of American citizens
by Iran is both absurd and offensive to the fundamentals
of American values.

(Appellants' Brief pp. 21-22).

To

compare the holding of hostages with the imposition of
economic pressure points out the flawed logic used by
Appellants throughout their brief.

If this were indeed

the case then many Americans from those of the Boston Tea
Party to consumers boycotting non-union lettuce are guilty
of holding others "hostage".

In addition, all labor unions

would be "guilty" of picketing and striking their employer
"hostages".
In summary, therefore, it is the position of Respondents
that the record before the lower court including the pleadiM 5
of the plaintiffs themselves clearly establish that the
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campaign to improve the county and city dog pound was politically motivated and was in no sense a "sham".

As such,

therefore, under the Noerr doctrine and other decisions cited
above, the defendants were absolutely privileged in their
conduct and Plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be maintained under any theory of state or federal statutory or
common law.
B.
Even Assuming Arguendo the Action of Defendants
to Petition a Government for Political Change is Only
Conditionally Privileged, Plaintiffs Have Failed to Prove
"Malice" as an Essential Element of Their Prima Facie Case.
1. Applicable Legal Standards for Interference
With Contractual Relations.
As the appellants have noted in their brief there is
no Utah case specifically recognizing the doctrine of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
(Appellants' Brief pp. 10-12).

It is Respondents' position

that this Court need not decide at this time whether such
a doctrine should be adopted in Utah since the Noerr defense
previously mentioned precludes liability under all state and
federal statutory and common law theories.

Thus, since there

is no liability as a matter of law there is no need to decide
whether the interference with prospective economic advantage
doctrine exists in Utah since that question should never
be reached.
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However, assuming ~rg_!:lendo that this Court declines to
adopt the Noerr doctrine of granting absolute immunity in
absence of a sham effort to petition a government for change,
then Respondents submit that AppeJlants have still failed to
prove the necessary elements of their case even assuming that
the doctrine of intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage is adopted in Utah.
Section 766B of the RP?tat:_e_~~nt___of Torts is generally
accepted as the foundation for the doctrine of interference
with prospective economic aovantage.

This Court in Soter

v. Wasatch Development Corp., 443 P.2d 663 (Utah 1968)
recognized similar elements required in order to prove
interference with an existing contract.

This Court stated:

In order to estab' sh a right to recover on
such a cause of action the plaintiff would have
to show that the defendants, without justification,
by some wrongful and malicious act, interferred
with the plaintiff's right of contract, and that
actual damages resulted.
Id. at 664.
It is the obligation of the plaintiff in an action
for interference with prospective economic advantage to
prove, as part of the

p_r:_im~

!acie case, a lack of justifi-

cation or privilege on the part of the defendants.

As stat~

by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Bahleda v. Hakison
Corp., 323 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1974):
The presence of a privilege is not an affirmative defense, rather, the absence of such a
-38-
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privilege is an element of the cause of action
which must be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff.
Id. at 121-122.
See also, Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 335 S.2d 641 (Fla. 1976);
Pocketbook, Inc. v. Walsh, 204 F. Sup~ 297 (D. Conn. 1962);
Harver v. Ohio National Life Ins. Co., 390 F. Sup~ 678

(D. Mo. 1974); Middleton v. Wallichs Music and Entertainment
Co., 536 P.2d 1072 (Ariz. App. 1975); and American Hot Rod
Assn., Inc. v. Carrier, 500 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1974).
The authorities are also uniform in holding that a
person who peaceably pursues his own interests is not liable
for interference with others' contractual obligations unless
his actions reach the threshhold of tortious conduct.

As

stated by the authority Prosser in his Treatise:
No case has been found in which intended
but purely incidental interference resulting from
the pursuit of the defendant's own end by proper
means has been held to be actionable. With intent
to interfere the usual basis of the action, the
cases have turned almost entirely upon the defendant's
motive or purpose, and the means by which he has
sought to accomplish it . . . . Some element of
ill will is seldom absent from intentional interference; and if the defendant has a legitimate
interest to protect, the addition of a spite
motive usually is not regarded sufficient to result
in liability . . . .
In general, it may be said
that any purpose sufficient to create a privilege
to disturb existing contractual relations, such as
the disinterested protection of the interests of
third persons, or those of the public . . . will
also justify interference with relations which are
merely prospective. Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed. at
951-954.
(Emphasis added).
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As stated by the New York Superior Court in Rosenberg
v. Del-Mar Division, 391 N.Y. Supp.2d 452 (1977):
With regard to the tort claim, summary judgment
was properly granted. As a general rule, interference
with the business relations of another is not actionable
unless unlawful means are used or the actor's sole
motive is to injure the plaintiff.
Plaintiff failed
to adequately demonstrate the existence of either
requirement as a bona fide factual question.
Id. at
453.
(Emphasis added).
Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
One may lawfully induce another to refrain
from having business relations with a third person,
although it injuriously affects such third person,
provided his action be to some legitimate interest
of his own, and no definite legal rights, such as
contract rights, are thereby violated.
Davis v.
Lewis, 487 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1972).
It is generally held that in a tort action for interference with cont:act the plaintiff must show "actual malice"
on the part of the defendant in order to prevail.

As noted

by the Illinois Supreme Court:
As previously mentioned, both parties agree
that actual malice must be shown in the instant
case; in addition, both agree that ill will alone
is not enough to establish actual malice and that
there must be a desire to harm, which is independent
of and unrelated to a desire to protect the acting
party's right and which is not reasonably related
to the defense of a recognized property or social
interest. Arlington Heights National Bank v. Arlington
Heights Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 229 N.E.2d 541,
518 (Ill. 1967).
(Emphasis added).
Respondents submit that a case involving a claim of
interference with a prospective business relationship or

-40Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contract involve the same requirement of "malice" as does
a claim of defamation or libel.

As stated by the California

Court of Appeals:
Justification in inducing breach of contract
is closely analygous to privilege in defamation.
Under Civil Code Section 47 a publication is privileged if made in any official proceeding authorized
by law . . . .
It seems obvious that in order for
the commissioner to be effective there must be an
open channel of all communication by which citizens
can call his attention to suspected wrongdoings.
That channel would quickly close if its use subjected
the user to a risk of liability for libel. Similarly,
here the tort of inducing breach of contract cannot
be used to dam up the open channel of communication
through which citizens may express their grievances
to public officials and challenge expenditures of
public funds.
Bledsoe v. Watson, 106 Cal. Rptr. 197,
200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
This Court has always held in cases of slander or
libel that it is the burden of the plaintiff to prove
actual malice which is spite, ill will, or hatred before
an action can be sustained.

Combs v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,

228 P.2d 272 (Utah 1951); Tanner v. Pillsbury Mills, 281
P.2d 391 (Utah 1955).
As to matters of public interest this Court held a
special high standard applies:
It is firmly established that matters of public
interest and concern are legitimate subjects of fair
comment and criticism, not only in newspapers, and
in radio and television broadcasts, but by members of
the public generally, and such comrn~nts a~d criticism
are not actionable, however severe in their term~,
unless they are made maliciously . . . . Ogden Bus
Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1976).
(Emphasis added) .
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It is likewise proper to grant summary judgment when
the pleadings and affidavits on file clearly show that a
claim of malice, implied or in law, or abuse of privilege
cannot be made.

This Court stated as early as 1933 the

following rule concerning the granting of summary judgment
in defamation cases:
The question of whether a qualifiedly privileged
article is written or published with malicious motive
or otherwise is generally speaking, a question of
fact to be determined by the jury.
However, in the
absence of proof that such communication was published
with actual maiice, it is within the power and duty of
the courts to say as a matter of law that the motive
of the publication was without malice.
Williams v.
Standard Examiner Publishing Co., 27 P.2d 1 (Utah 1933).
(Emphasis added) .
In the KSL case, supra, this Court quoted from a New
York decision in which summary judgment was granted in a
defamation case in which no malice could be shown.

The

New York court stated:
This Court accordingly concludes that plaintiffs'
allegations of actual malice, in their complaint, and
in opposition to this motion, are insufficient, and
fail to raise triable issues of fact.
Under the circumstances, summary judgment dismissing the complaint
is the appropriate remedy.
551 P.2d at 226 quoting
Commercial Programing Unlimited v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 367 N.Y.S.2d 986.
Numerous cases have held that summary judgment was
proper in instances in which the public interest was being
pursued in claims of libel or slander.

In Safrets, Inc. v.
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Gannett Co., Inc., 361 N.Y. Supp 2d 276 (N.Y.S.C. 1974) a
pet store owner brought suit against a newspaper and others
alleging damages because of statements contained in a
newspaper article concerning the plaintiff's treatment of
animals.

Addressing the issue of privilege, the court cited

cases dealing with constitutional privileges as defined by
the United States Supreme Court.

The court then stated:

We must decide whether the offending article
here involved a question of general public interest
or concern under Rosenbloom . . . .
However that may
be, we find that this article dealing with humane
treatment of animals and birds, or conversely,
prevention of cruelty to them, involves a subject of
general concern . . . • There is no evidence
here that the article was published with knowledge
that it was false.
Id. at 280-281.
The court granted summary judgment to the defendant newspaper
and acknowledged that the freedom of speech as to matters of
public interest afforded a privilege to a person commenting
on the inhumane treatment of animals.
In Hahn v. Andrello, 355 N.Y. Supp. 2d 850 (N.Y.S.C. App.
Div. 1974) an action was brought by an attorney against a
councilman who for alleged defamation made when the councilman
criticized the legal work done by the attorney with reference
to problems involving the city dump.

The court found that

the attack went to the profession and business qualifications
of the plaintiff but noted that the defamation involved matters
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of public interest--namely an ordinance relating to a city
dump.

Because of this fact, the court stated, it was

necessary for the plaintiff to prove and plead actual malice
and failure to do so resulted in a dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint.
In Cole Fisher Rogow, Inc. v. Carl Ally, Inc., 228 N.Y.
Supp. 2d 556 (N.Y.S.C. App. Div. 1968) an action was commencec
by an advertising agency for libel and slander arising from
an advertisement which was inserted in opposition to that of
the agency's client and which was critical of the type of
advertisement used by the client.

The plaintiff claimed

business loss from the defamatory statement.

The court held

that the privilege of criticizing public affairs extended to
advertisements and that actual malice was required for the
plaintiff to prevail.

The court stated:

Plaintiff itself, would seem to negative any
claim of actual malice when it asserts the advertisement was used in an effort to defeat the opposition-a legitimate device for use by a competitor.
Id. at
564.
In the case of Moresi v. Teche Publishing Co., 298 So.2d
901 (La. Ct. App. 1974) an action was brought against a
newspaper for an article allegedly defaming plaintiff's
beach area by saying it was not fit for recreational purposes.
The plaintiff sought damages for the loss of revenue caused
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by the business deterioration.

The court concluded that

the article dealt with a subject of public concern, namely,
the use of public land.

The court then stated:

Therefore, it is probable, that as a matter
of law, these articles relating to a matter of
public interest enjoy a constitutional privilege
under the First Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. Even if the articles were
defamatory, and we have concluded they are not,
plaintiff could not recover for any damage to his
business resulting therefrom without showing that
the articles were false and were printed maliciously
with a reckless disregard for truth.
Id. at 906.
The preceding cases from Utah and other jurisdictions
illustrate that matters of public interest concerning speech
require protection of the highest standard--a showing
of actual malice.

It should be noted that several of the

cases previously referred to involve claims made by persons
and businesses for loss of business income.

In these cases

it was still required that actual malice be proven.
It should make little difference, for example, whether
a person publishes or speaks in a meeting and states that
an amusement park is unsanitary or whether he states at
the meeting that he is encouraging all people not to patronize
the amusement park because it is unsanitary.
the damage to the plaintiff would be the same.

In both cases
The first

case, however, would involve defamation and the second case
would involve tortious interference of prospective economic
advantage.
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Certainly, if the matter is of sufficient public concern
the standard of actual malice should be applicable in either
case.

The definition of "actual malice" has been stated by

the United States Supreme Court as publishing a statement
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was true or not.

The defendant must entertain

serious doubt as to the truth of the statement made.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254

New York

(1964); and St. Amant v.

Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
The preceding discussion illustrates the correctness of
the lower court's decision even if it is assumed arguendo
that the Noerr doctrine of absolute inununity does not apply
in this case.

The following discussion focuses upon these

legal standards as applied to the facts of the instant case.
2.

Legal Standards Applied to Facts of the Instant

Case.
If this Court chooses to recognize the tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage it
is incumbent to also define the elements required.

One of

the essential elements necessary in any such case is a showing
by the plaintiff of an improper motive or no justification.
This in turn requires a showing of actual malice in the
actions taken by the defendants.
Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint
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states that "Defendants' campaign to interfere with and
destroy the tourist business in Dinosaur Land, Utah is
motivated by their personal, political and other beliefs
relating to city and county government in Vernal City and
Uintah County, and are not related to Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' businesses."
The "beliefs" referred to by Plaintiffs in their Complaint are clearly within public interest and concern
Section 76-9-301 (U.C.A.) which provides that a person
commits cruelty to animals if he fails to maintain necessary
food, care, or shether or confines an animal in a cruel
manner.

There can be no serious doubt that the humane care

of animals is a subject of social importance and public
interest.

As stated in the plaintiffs' own Complaint, the

sole motivation of Defendants in making the statements and
in conducting the campaign was to influence the actions of
the elected officials.
There is nothing in the file to show that the statements
made by Defendants were done in a reckless manner.

The

affidavit of Lonnie Johnson shows that all statements
concerning the conditions of the pound were made from the
investigation of Johnson himself or from investigations of
Humane Society agents.

There is no showing that statements
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concerning the pound were made in disbelief of the truth.
Likewise, there is no showing that the defendants bore any
ill will toward the plaintiffs or attempted to injure them
economically for any selfish or competitive gain.
The most that can be said from the file as it now exists
is that the actions of Defendants were taken in the hope that
economic pressure could be brought about by Plaintiffs and
other citizens of Uintah County against the elected officials
to effectuate the change in the dog pound.

Such conduct and

motivation can hardly be said to be the "malice" which is
required to establish a lack of justification and improper
motive necessary for a prima facie case.
Respondents submit that except for the bare allegations
contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint of improper motive and
lack of justification, there is not a single bit of evidence
contained in the file to show that the statements made by
defendant Lonnie Johnson in his affidavit are not correct.
(R. 192) .

As such, the lower court was justified in ruling

as a matter of law that the actions taken by the defendants
were not improper and were justified and that therefore
Plaintiffs' prima facie case could not be proven.

Just as

in defamation cases, in the absence of proof of such malice,
summary judgment is proper.

Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc.,
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551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976); Denman v. Star Broadcasting Co.,
497 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1972).
In conclusion, the record before the district court
after four years of litigation showed that the defendants did
not act with a reckless disregard for the interests of the
plaintiffs nor did they act with ill will intending to harm
the plaintiffs.

The record showed from Plaintiffs' own

pleading that Defendants acted for a social interest in the
protection of animals and therefore a finding of actual malice
could not be made which would establish the prima facie case
of the plaintiffs.

The lower court properly granted summary

judgment even assuming arguendo that only a conditional
privilege existed.
CONCLUSION
The issue involved in the present case is one beyond the
immediate facts.

While Plaintiffs assert that they have been

economically damaged by the actions of Defendants, the inverse
could just as easily be asserted by Defendants, i.e., that the
right to attempt social change has been injured by the filing
of this lawsuit by Plaintiffs.

Does the U.S. and Utah Consti-

tutions which guarantee free speech and the ~ight to petition
governmental change permit the stoppage of these political
rights by the filing of lawsuits based upon tort theories
developed for the protection of economic abuse?
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The answer to this question is found in the Noerr doctrine and the subsequent decisions interpreting this doctrine
All state and federal statutory and common law actions must
yield to First Amendment rights so long as the efforts being
made do not constitute a sham where the real motive is other
than seeking political change.

To grant a cause of action

to Plaintiffs in the instant case where there is no doubt
that such a sham does not exist, is to effectively chill any
effect of legitimate groups in the future to seek political
change.

In effect, such groups would always be subject to

suit by some member of society who could claim injury because
of the hoped for political change or injury from merely the
attempt to change.

Economic boycott has always been a legi-

timate method in American history to encourage such change
and should not now be prohibited because of alleged indirect
economic harm.
This Court has never recognized the tort of interference
with prospective business advantage.

Respondents submit that

this case does not require such a determination because of thi
absolute right existing under the Noerr doctrine.

However, ir

the alternative, if such tort is recognized the finding of
"malice" must also be recognized as essential to a prima ~
case.

Here, the record is barren of any such malice and the
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lower court was justified, just as in defamation cases,
to grant judgment as a matter of law.
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
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